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ABSTRACT
To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and
hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to present material at
a more appropriate level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking if
teachers would otherwise have incentives to teach to the top of the distribution. We propose a simple
model nesting these effects. We compare 61 Kenyan schools in which students were randomly assigned
to a first grade class with 60 in which students were assigned based on initial achievement. In non-tracking
schools, students randomly assigned to academically stronger peers scored higher, consistent with
a positive direct effect of academically strong peers. However, compared to their counterparts in non-tracking
schools, students in tracking schools scored 0.14 standard deviations higher after 18 months, and this
effect persisted one year after the program ended. Furthermore, students at all levels of the distribution
benefited from tracking. Students near the median of the pre-test distribution benefited similarly whether
assigned to the lower or upper section. A natural interpretation is that the direct effect of high-achieving
peers is positive, but that tracking benefited lower-achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers






















To the extent that students benefit from having higher-achieving peers, tracking students 
into separate classes by prior achievement could disadvantage low-achieving students 
while benefiting high-achieving students, thereby exacerbating inequality (Denis Epple, 
Elizabeth Newton and Richard Romano, 2002). On the other hand, tracking could 
potentially allow teachers to more closely match instruction to students’ needs, benefiting 
all students. This suggests that the impact of tracking may depend on teachers’ 
incentives.  We build a model nesting these effects. In the model, students can potentially 
generate direct student-to-student spillovers as well as indirectly affect both the overall 
level of teacher effort and teachers’ choice of the level at which to target instruction. 
Teacher choices depend on the distribution of students’ test scores in the class as well as 
on whether the teacher’s reward is a linear, concave, or convex function of test scores. 
The further away a student’s own level is from what the teacher is teaching, the less the 
student benefits; if this distance is too great, she does not benefit at all.  
We derive implications of this model, and test them using experimental data on 
tracking from Kenya. In 2005, 140 primary schools in western Kenya received funds to 
hire an extra grade one teacher. Of these schools, 121 had a single first-grade class and 
split their first-grade class into two sections, with one section taught by the new teacher. 
In 60 randomly selected schools, students were assigned to sections based on prior 
achievement. In the remaining 61 schools, students were randomly assigned to one of the 
two sections.  
We find that tracking students by prior achievement raised scores for all students, 
even those assigned to lower achieving peers. On average, after 18 months, test scores 
were 0.14 standard deviations higher in tracking schools than in non-tracking schools 
(0.18 standard deviations higher after controlling for baseline scores and other control 
variables). After controlling for the baseline scores, students in the top half of the pre-
assignment distribution gained 0.19 standard deviations, and those in the bottom half 
gained 0.16 standard deviations. Students in all quantiles benefited from tracking. 
Furthermore, tracking had a persistent impact: one year after tracking ended, students in 
tracking schools scored 0.16 standard deviations higher (0.18 standard deviations higher 
with control variables). This first set of findings allows us to reject a special case of the 
model, in which all students benefit from higher-achieving peers but teacher behavior 
does not respond to class composition.   
2Our second finding is that students in the middle of the distribution gained as much 
from tracking as those at the bottom or the top. Furthermore, when we look within 
tracking schools using a regression discontinuity analysis, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that there is no difference in endline achievement between the lowest scoring student 
assigned to the high-achievement section and the highest scoring student assigned to the 
low-achievement section, despite the much higher-achieving peers in the upper section.  
These results are inconsistent with another special case of the model, in which 
teachers are equally rewarded for gains at all levels of the distribution, and so would 
choose to teach to the median of their classes.  If this were the case, instruction would be 
less well-suited to the median student under tracking.  Moreover, students just above the 
median would perform much better under tracking than those just below the median, for 
while they would be equally far away from the teacher’s target teaching level, they would 
have the advantage of having higher-achieving peers. 
In contrast, the results are consistent with the assumption that teachers’ rewards are a 
convex function of test scores.  With tracking, this leads teachers assigned to the lower-
achievement section to teach closer to the median student’s level than those assigned to 
the upper section, although teacher effort is higher in the upper section.  In such a model, 
the median student may be better off under tracking and may potentially be better off in 
either the lower-achievement or higher-achievement section.  
The assumption that rewards are a convex function of test scores is a good 
characterization of the education system in Kenya and in many developing countries. The 
Kenyan system is centralized, with a single national curriculum and national exams. To 
the extent that civil-service teachers face incentives, those incentives are based on the 
scores of their students on the national primary school exit exam given at the end of 
eighth grade. But since many students drop out before then, the teachers have incentives 
to focus on the students who are likely to take the exam, students at the very top of the 
first-grade class. Indeed, Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin (2009) show that textbooks based 
on the curriculum benefited only the initially higher-achieving students, suggesting that 
the exams and associated curriculum are not well-suited to the typical student. These 
features seem common to most educational systems in developing countries.  
The model also has implications for the effects of the test score distribution in non-
tracking schools. Specifically, it suggests that an upward shift of the distribution of peer 
achievement will strongly raise test scores for a student with initial achievement at the 
3top of the distribution, have an ambiguous impact on scores for a student closer to the 
middle, and raise scores at the bottom.  This is so because, while all students benefit from 
the direct effect of an increase in peer quality, the change in peer composition also 
generates an upward shift in the teacher’s instruction level. The higher instruction level 
will benefit students at the top; hurt those students in the middle who find themselves 
further away from the instruction level; and leave the bottom students unaffected, since 
they are in any case too far from the target instruction level to benefit from instruction. 
Estimates exploiting the random assignment of students to sections in non-tracking 
schools are consistent with these implications of the model. 
While we do not have direct observation on the instruction level and how it varied 
across schools and across sections in our experiment, we present some corroborative 
evidence that teacher behavior was affected by tracking. First, teachers were more likely 
to be in class and teaching in tracking schools, particularly in the high-achievement 
sections, a finding consistent with the model’s predictions. Second, students in the lower 
half of the initial distribution gained comparatively more from tracking in the most basic 
skills, while students in the top half of the initial distribution gained more from tracking 
in the somewhat more advanced skills. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
teachers are tailoring instruction to class composition, although this could also be 
mechanically true in any successful intervention. 
Rigorous evidence on the effect of tracking on learning of students at various points 
of the prior achievement distribution is limited and much of it comes from studies of 
tracking in the U.S., a context that may have limited applicability for education systems 
in developing countries. Reviewing the early literature, Betts and Shkolnik (1999) 
conclude that while there is an emerging consensus that high-achievement students do 
better in tracking schools than in non-tracking schools and that low-achievement students 
do worse, the consensus is based largely on invalid comparisons. When they compare 
similar students in tracking and non-tracking high schools, Betts and Shkolnik (1999) 
conclude that low-achieving students are neither hurt nor helped by tracking; top students 
are helped; and there is some evidence that middle-scoring students may be hurt.  
Another difficulty is that tracking schools may be different from non-tracking 
schools. Manning and Pischke (2006) show that controlling for baseline scores is not 
sufficient to eliminate the selection bias when comparing students attending 
comprehensive versus selective schools in the United Kingdom. Three recent studies that 
4tried to address the endogeneity of tracking decisions have found that tracking might be 
beneficial to students, or at least not detrimental, in the lower-achievement tracks. First, 
Figlio and Page (2002) compare achievement gains across similar students attending 
tracking and non-tracking schools in the U.S. This strategy yields estimates that are very 
different from those obtained by comparing individuals schooled in different tracks. In 
particular, Figlio and Page (2002) find no evidence that tracking harms lower-
achievement students. Second, Zimmer (2003), also using U.S. data, finds quasi-
experimental evidence that the positive effects of achievement-specific instruction 
associated with tracking overcome the negative peer effects for students in lower-
achievement tracks. Finally, Lefgren (2004) find that, in Chicago public schools, the 
difference between the achievement of low and high achieving students is no greater in 
schools that track that in school that do not. 
This paper is also related to a large literature that investigates peer effects in the 
classroom (e.g., Hoxby, 2000; Zimmerman, 2003; Angrist and Lang, 2004). While this 
literature has, mainly for data reasons, focused mostly on the direct effect of peers, there 
are a few exceptions, and these have results generally consistent with ours. Hoxby and 
Weingarth (2006) use the frequent re-assignment of pupils to schools in Wake County to 
estimate models of peer effects, and find that students seem to benefit mainly from 
having homogeneous peers, which they attribute to indirect effects through teaching 
practices. Lavy, Paserman and Schlosser (2008) find that the fraction of repeaters in a 
class has a negative effect on the scores of the other students, in part due to deterioration 
of the teacher’s pedagogical practices. Finally, Clark (2007) finds no impact on test 
scores of attending selective schools for marginal students who just qualified for the elite 
school on the basis of their score, suggesting that the level of teaching may be too high 
for them.  
It is impossible to know if the results of this study will generalize until further studies 
are conducted in different contexts, but it seems likely that the general principle will 
hold: it will be difficult to assess the impact of tracking based solely on small random 
variations in peer composition that are unlikely to generate big changes in teacher 
behavior. Our model suggests that tracking may be particularly beneficial for low-
achieving students when teachers’ incentives are to focus on students who are above 
median achievement levels. Education systems are typically complex, having reward 
functions for schools and teachers that generate various threshold effects at different test 
5score levels. But virtually all developing countries teachers have incentives to focus on 
the strongest students. This suggests that our estimate of large positive impacts of 
tracking would be particularly likely to generalize to those contexts. This situation also 
seems to often be the norm in developed countries, with a few exceptions, such the No 
Child Left Behind program in the U.S. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on 
the Kenyan education system and presents a model nesting various mechanisms through 
which tracking could affect learning. Section 3 describes the study design, data, and 
estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the main results on test scores. Section 5 presents 
additional evidence on the impact of tracking on teacher behavior. Section 6 concludes 
and discusses policy implications.  
 
2. Model  
We consider a model that nests several different possible channels through which 
tracking students into two streams (a lower track and an upper track) could affect 
students’ outcomes. In particular, the model allows peers to generate both direct student-
to-student spillovers as well as to indirectly affect both the overall level of teacher effort 
and teachers’ choice of the level at which to target instruction.
1 However, the model also 
allows for either of these channels to be shut off. Within the subset of cases in which the 
teacher behavior matters, we will consider the case in which teachers’ payoffs are 
convex, linear, or concave in student test scores.  
Suppose that educational outcomes for student i in class j,  , are given by:  
 
where   is the student’s pretest score,   is the average scores of other students in the 
class,   is teacher effort, x
* is the target level to which the teacher orients instruction, 
and   represents other i.i.d. stochastic student and class-specific factors that are 
symmetric and single-peaked. In this equation,   reflects the direct effect of a 
student’s peers on learning, e.g. through peer-to-peer interactions. For simplicity of 
exposition, in what follows we remove the class indices. 
                                                           
1 Epple, Newton and Romano (2002) consider the equilibrium implications of tracking in public school in a 
model where the indirect effect of peer through teacher effort is shut off, but private school can chose 
whether or not to track, and students can chose which school to attend.  
6We will focus on the case when h is a decreasing function of the absolute value of the 
difference between the student’s initial score and the target teaching level, and is zero 
when   , although we also consider the possibility that h is a constant, shutting 
down this part of the model.   
The teacher chooses   and   to maximize a payoff function P of the distribution of 
children’s endline achievement minus the cost of effort   where   is a convex 
function. We assume that the marginal cost to teachers of increasing effort eventually 
becomes arbitrarily high as teacher effort approaches some level ē. We will also consider 
the case in which the cost of effort is zero below ē, so teachers always choose effort ē and 
this part of the model shuts down. We will consider two kinds of teachers: civil servants, 
and contract teachers hired to teach the new sections in the ETP program. Contract 
teachers have higher-powered incentives than civil servants and, as shown in Duflo, 
Dupas and Kremer (2009) put in considerably more effort. In particular, we will assume 
that the reward to contract teachers from any increment in test scores equals λ times the 
reward to civil service teachers from the same increment in test scores, where λ is 
considerably greater than 1. 
The choice of   will depend on the distribution of pre-test scores.
2 We assume that 
within each school the distribution of initial test scores is continuous, quasi-concave, and 
symmetric around the median. This appears to be consistent with our data (see Figure 1).  
With convexity of teachers’ payoffs in both student test scores and teacher effort in 
general, there could be multiple local maxima for teachers’ choice of effort and  . 
Nonetheless, it is possible to characterize the solution, at least under certain conditions. 
Our first proposition states a testable implication of the special case where peers only 
affect each other directly.  
 
 
                                                           
2 We rule out the possibility that teachers divide their time between teaching different parts of the class. In 
this case, tracking could reduce the number of levels at which a teacher would need to teach and thus 
increase the proportion of time students benefited from instruction. If teachers face some fixed cost in 
changing the focus teaching level,  , they will then optimally use some type of Ss process to adjust  . 
In this case, more teachers will change    in response to large changes in the composition of student body 
associated with tracking than in response to small changes associated with random fluctuations in class 
composition. As discussed below, we think the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that some 
teachers change their teaching techniques even in response to random fluctuations in class composition. 
Fixed costs of changing  may not be that great because this change may simply mean proceeding through 
the same material more slowly or more quickly.  
 
7Proposition 1:  Consider a special case of the model in which teachers do not respond to 
class composition because h( ) is a constant and either g( ) is a constant or the cost of 
effort is zero below ē. In that case, tracking will not change average test scores but will 
reduce test scores for those below the median of the original distribution and increase test 
scores for those above the median. 
 
Proof: Under tracking, average peer achievement is as high as possible for students above 
the median and as low a possible for students below the median. ■ 
 
Note that this proposition would be true even with a more general equation for test scores 
that allowed for interactions between students own test scores and those of their peers, as 
long as students always benefit from higher achieving peers.  
 
Proposition 2: If teacher payoffs, P, are convex in post-test scores, in a non-tracked class 
the target teaching level,  , must be above the median of the distribution. If teacher 
payoffs are linear in post-test scores, then   will be equal to the median of the 
distribution. If teacher payoffs are concave in post-test scores, then   will be below the 
median of the distribution. 
 
Proof: Consider first the convex case. Since the distribution is assumed to be symmetric 
and quasi-concave, the peak of the distribution must be at the median. To see that   
must be above the median, suppose that   were less than the median. Denote the 
distance between   and the median as D. Now consider an alternative  , denoted  ′, 
equal to the median plus D. By symmetry of the distribution, the total number of students 
at any distance from  ′ equals the total number of students at any distance from  . 
However, the distribution of students within range θ of x′
* first order stochastically 
dominates the distribution of students within a range θ of  . Thus, by convexity of the P 
function the teacher would be better off with the target teaching level  ′.  
To complete the proof for the convex case it is simply necessary to show that the 
teacher will not choose   equal to the median of the distribution. To see this, note that 
since the distribution is continuous, increasing   slightly from the median will lead to a 
second order reduction in the number of pupils at any distance from the target teaching 
level but to a first order increase in their test score and thus in the P function.  
Arguments for the linear and concave case are analogous. ■ 
 
Proposition 3:   
8•  If f( ) is increasing in peer test scores, then a uniform increase in peer baseline 
achievement will raise test scores for any students those with x >  , and the 
effect will be the largest for students with x >  , but   +θ ; have an ambiguous 
effects on test scores for students with scores between   and  ; and 
increase test scores for students with test scores below  , although the 
increase will be smaller than that for students with test scores greater than  .  
•  If f( ) is a constant, so there is no direct effect of peers, then a uniform increase in 
peer achievement will cause students with x >   to have higher test scores and 
those with x between    -  θ and   to have lower scores.  There will be no 
change in scores for those with x <   - θ.  
 
Proof: Consider first the case in which f( ) is increasing in peer test scores.  A uniform 
increase in peer baseline achievement will lead to an increase in the focus teaching level. 
Students with x >    and x<  +θ will be closer to the target teaching level. They will 
thus benefit not only from the direct impact of higher-achieving peers but also from the 
indirect impact on teachers’ choice of target instruction level. Students whose initial test 
scores were above   +θ are still too far from the target level of instruction, but still 
benefit from the increase in test scores (note that in the case where the teacher reward is a 
convex function of student test scores, there may not be any student above   +θ, as  
may have been chosen to be within θ of the top of the distribution).  
Students with scores between   and    benefit from the higher achievement of 
their peers and from any increase in teacher effort associated with the higher peer 
achievement. On the other hand, these students now are further away from the new target 
teaching level. The overall effect is ambiguous. 
Students with scores less than   were not in range of the teacher’s instruction 
prior to the increase in test scores, and are not advantaged or disadvantaged by the change 
in the target teaching level. However, they benefit from the higher-achievement of their 
peers. If f( ) is not increasing in test scores (no direct peer effects), the proof follows from 
the discussion of the indirect effects. ■ 
 
Proposition 4:  Let  L denote the target teaching level in the lower section in a tracking 
school and  U denote the target level in the upper section. If payoffs are convex,  L 
will be within distance θ of xm, where xm denotes the 50
th percentile of the original 
distribution. If payoffs are concave,  U will be within distance θ of xm. If payoffs are 
linear, both  U and  L will be within distance θ of xm. 
 
9Proof: To see this for the convex case, suppose that  L < xm - θ. Increasing   would 
both increase the number of students at any distance from   and the base score xi of 
students at any distance from  . Thus it would be preferred. Proofs for the other cases 
are analogous. ■ 
 
Proposition 5: Denote the distance between   and the target teaching level in the upper 
section   as  DU and denote the corresponding distance between   and   as DL. If 
payoffs are convex and the third derivative is non-negative, then DU > DL, so the median 
student is closer to the target teaching level in the lower track. If payoffs are linear in 
student scores then DU = DL. If teacher payoffs are concave in student test scores and the 
third derivative is non-positive, then DU < DL.  
 
Proof: Consider first the case of convex payoffs. Suppose that DU = DL. In that case, both 
the teacher teaching the lower track and the teacher teaching the upper track would have 
the same number of students within any distance, by the symmetry of the original 
distribution. 
The first order necessary condition for an optimum is that increasing   marginally 
reduces the contribution to the P function from students to the left of   by the same 
amount it increases the contribution to the P function from students to the right of  . To 
see this necessary condition cannot be satisfied simultaneously for both the low 
achievement class and high achievement class if the target teaching levels in each class 
are symmetric around the median, note that if   is within distance θ of   and   is 
the same distance away from   then by quasi-convexity increasing   will decrease the 
total number of students at any distance D, whereas marginally increasing   will 
increase the total number of students within any distance by the same amount, again by 
symmetry. Thus increases in   will generate relatively more gains for the P function to 
the right of   compared to losses on the left in the low achieving class than in the high-
achieving class as long as the degree of convexity is non-increasing.  
Arguments are analogous for the linear and concave cases. Under linearity, the 
median student will be equidistant from the target teaching level in the lower and upper 
section. Under concavity, they will be closer in the top section.■ 
All of this implies that the median student will be closer to the target teaching level in 
the bottom of the distribution than in the top of the distribution. 
 
10Proposition 6: Teacher effort will be greater in the upper than in the lower section under 
convexity, equal under linearity, and lesser under concavity. However, for high enough λ, 
the difference between effort levels of contract teachers assigned to the high- and low-
achievement sections will become arbitrarily small. 
 
Proof: Consider the convex case first. Teachers will choose   so as to maximize the 
gain to their P function. Take  L as fixed. The teacher of the upper section has the 
option of choosing a target teaching level  u that is symmetric around x m. If the teacher 
does this, then the teacher in the top section will have the exact same number of students 
at any distance as the teacher in the bottom section. In this case, the marginal gain to the 
P function associated with an increment in their test scores will be greater for the teacher 
in the upper track by the convexity of the P function. 
 As shown in Proposition 5, under a convex payoff function, the teacher of the top 
section will in fact choose    greater than xm + (xm – xL) and thus will have fewer 
children within any distance than the teacher of the lower section. However, by revealed 
preference, the marginal increase in the payoff function from extra effort must be greater 
than the marginal gain to the P function from the impact of extra effort on increasing the 
scores of students within range of  L. The proofs for the linear and concave cases follow 
a similar logic. 
The second result (that for high enough λ, the difference between effort levels of 
contract teachers assigned to the high- and low-achievement classes will become 
arbitrarily small) is due to the assumption that the cost of effort becomes arbitrarily high 
as a maximum effort level ē is approached. ■ 
 
Proposition 7. Under a linear teacher payoff function, a student initially at the median of 
the distribution will score higher if assigned to the upper section than the lower section 
under tracking.  
 
Proof: Under linear teacher payoffs, a student at the median will experience equal teacher 
effort in the upper and lower sections, and will be equally far from the target teaching 
level.  However, the student will have stronger peers in the top section. ■ 
  
Note that under convex teacher payoffs, the student at the median will experience higher 
teacher effort in the top section (compared to the bottom section) and will have stronger 
peers but will have teaching which is not as good a match for his or her initial 
11achievement. The model therefore offers no definitive prediction on whether the median 
student performs better in the upper or lower track. Similarly, if teacher payoffs, P, are 
concave in student test scores, then the student would have a more appropriate teaching 
target level but lower teacher effort in the top section. 
 
This model thus nests, as special cases, models with only a direct effect of peers or only 
an effect going through teacher behavior. It also nests special cases in which teacher 
payoffs are linear, concave, or convex in students’ test scores. Nevertheless, the model 
make some restrictive assumptions. In particular, teacher effort has the same impact on 
student test score gains anywhere in the distribution. In a richer model, teacher effort 
might have a different impact on test scores at different places along the distribution. 
Student effort might also respond endogenously to teacher effort and the target teaching 
level. In such a model, ultimate outcomes will be a composite function of teacher effort, 
teacher focus level, and student effort, which in turn would be a function of teacher effort 
and teaching level. In this case, we conjecture that the results would go through as long as 
the curvature assumptions on the payoff function were replaced by curvature assumptions 
on the resulting composite function for payoffs. Multiplicative separability of e and x* is 
important to the results, however. 
 
 Propositions 1, 2 and 4 provide empirical implications that can be used to test whether 
the data is consistent with the different special cases.    
Below we argue that the data are inconsistent with the special case with no teacher 
response, the special case with no direct effects of peers, and the special case in which 
teacher payoffs are linear or concave in students’ scores. However, our results are 
consistent with a model in which both direct and indirect effects operate and teachers’ 
payoffs are convex with student test scores, which is consistent with our description of 
the education system in Kenya. 
Note that this model has no clear prediction for the effect of the variance of initial 
achievement on test scores in an untracked class or for the interaction between the effect 
of tracking and the initial variance of the distribution.
3 
                                                           
3 To see that changes in the distribution of initial scores that increase variance of these scores could reduce 
average test scores and the effect of tracking, consider an increase in dispersion so no two students are 
within distance θ of each other. Then teachers can never teach more than one pupil. Average test scores will 
be low, and tracking will have no impact on   or teacher effort. To see that changes in the distribution 
12 
 
3. The Tracking Experiment: Background, Experimental Design, Data, 
and Estimation Strategy 
3.1. Background: Primary Education in Kenya  
Like many other countries, Kenya has a centralized education system with a single 
national curriculum and national exams. Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin (2009) show that 
textbooks based on the curriculum benefited only the initially higher-achieving students, 
suggesting that the exams and associated curriculum are not well-suited to the typical 
student.  
Most primary-school teachers are hired centrally through the civil service and they 
face weak incentives. As we show in Section 5, absence rates among civil-service 
teachers are high. In addition, some teachers are hired on short-term contracts by local 
school committees, most of whose members are elected by parents. These contract 
teachers typically have much stronger incentives, partly because they do not have civil-
service and union protection but also because a good track record as a contract teacher 
can help them obtain a civil-service job. 
To the extent that schools and teachers face incentives, the incentives are largely 
based on their students’ scores on the primary school exit exam. Many students repeat 
grades or drop out before they can take the exam, and so the teachers have limited 
incentives to focus on students who are not likely to ever take the exam. Extrinsic 
incentives are thus stronger at the top of the distribution than the bottom.  For many 
teachers, the intrinsic rewards of teaching to the top of the class are also likely to be 
greater than those of teaching to the bottom of the class, as such students are more similar 
to themselves and teachers are likely to interact more with their families and with the 
students themselves in the future. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that increase variance could increase the impact of tracking, consider moving from a degenerate 
distribution, with all the mass concentrated at a single point, to a distribution with some dispersion. 
Tracking will have no effect on test scores with a degenerate distribution, but will increase average scores 
with tracking. Increases in dispersion could also increase average test scores in the absence of tracking. To 
see this, suppose teacher payoffs are very convex, so teachers focus on the strongest student in the class. 
Suppose also that the highest achieving student’s initial score exceeds that of the second highest-scoring 
pupil by more than θ. Consider a move from the initial distribution to a distribution with the same support, 
but in which some students were pushed to the boundaries of this support. More students will be within 
range of the teacher and hence teacher effort and average test scores will rise. 
13Until recently, families had to pay for primary school. Students from the poorest 
families often had trouble attending school and dropped out early. But recently, Kenya 
has, like several other countries, abolished school fees. This led to a large enrollment 
increase and to greater heterogeneity in student preparation. Many of the new students are 
first generation learners and have not attended preschools (which are neither free nor 
compulsory). Students thus differ vastly in age, school preparedness, and support at 
home. 
 
3.2. Experimental Design 
This study was conducted within the context of a primary school class-size reduction 
experiment in Western Province, Kenya. Under the Extra-Teacher Program (ETP), with 
funding from the World Bank, ICS Africa provided 140 schools with funds to hire an 
additional  first-grade teacher on a contractual basis starting in May 2005, the beginning 
of the second term of that school year.
4 The program was designed to allow schools to 
add an additional section in first grade. Most schools (121) had only one first grade 
section, and split it into two sections. Schools that already had two or more first grade 
sections added one section. Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2009) reports on the effect of the 
class size reduction and teacher contracts.  
We examine the impact of tracking and peer effects using two different versions of 
the ETP experiment.
  In 61 schools randomly selected (using a random number generator) 
from the 121 schools that originally had only one grade 1 section, grade 1 pupils were 
randomly assigned to one of two sections. We call these schools the “non-tracking 
schools.” In the remaining 60 schools (the “tracking schools”), children were assigned to 
sections based on scores on exams administered by the school during the first term of the 
2005 school year. In the tracking schools, students in the lower half of the distribution of 
baseline exam scores were assigned to one section and those in the upper half were 
assigned to another section. The 19 schools that originally had two or more grade one 
classes were also randomly divided into tracking and non-tracking schools, but it proved 
difficult to organize the tracking consistently in these schools.
5 Thus, in the analysis that 
                                                           
4 The school year in Kenya starts in January and ends in November. It is divided into three terms, with 
month-long breaks in April and August. 
5 In these schools, the sections that were taught by civil service teachers rather than contract teachers 
sometimes recombined or exchanged students.    
14follows, we focus on the 121 schools that initially had a single grade 1 section and 
exclude 19 schools (10 tracking, 9 non-tracking schools) that initially had two or more.
6 
After students were assigned to sections, the contract teacher and the civil-service 
teacher were randomly assigned to sections. Parents could request that their children be 
reassigned, but this only occurred in a handful of cases. The main source of 
noncompliance with the initial assignment was teacher absenteeism, which sometimes led 
the two grade 1 sections to be combined. On average across five unannounced school 
visits to each school, we found the two sections combined 14.4% of the time in non-
tracking schools and 9.7% of time in tracking schools (note that the likelihood that 
sections are combined depends on teacher effort, itself an endogenous outcome, as we 
show below in Section 5). When sections were not combined, 92% of students in non-
tracking schools and 96% of students in tracking schools were found in their assigned 
section.  The analysis below is based on the initial assignment regardless of which section 
the student eventually joined.  
The program lasted for 18 months, which included the last two terms of 2005 and the 
entire 2006 school year. In the second year of the program, all children not repeating the 
grade remained assigned to the same group of peers and the same teacher. The fraction of 
students who repeated grade 1 and thus participated in the program for only the first year 
was 23% in non-tracking schools and 21% in tracking schools (the p-value of the 
difference is 0.17).
7  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the 121 schools in our sample. As would be 
expected given the random assignment, tracking and non-tracking schools look very 
similar. Since tests administered within schools prior to the program are not comparable 
across schools, they are normalized such that the mean score in each school is zero and 
the standard deviation is one. Figure 2 shows the average baseline score of a student’s 
classmates as a function of the student’s own baseline score in tracking and non-tracking 
schools. Average non-normalized peer test scores are not correlated with the student’s 
                                                           
6 Note that the randomization of the schools into the tracking and non tracking was stratified according to 
whether the school originally had one or more grade 1 sections.  
7 Students enrolled in grade 2 in 2005 and who repeated grade 2 in 2006 were randomly assigned to either 
the contract teacher or the civil-service teacher in 2006. All the analysis is based on the initial assignment, 
so they are excluded from the study and excluded from the measures of peer composition at endline. 
Students who repeated grade 1 in 2006 remain in the data set and are included in the measures of peer 
composition at endline.  New pupils who joined the school after the introduction of the program were 
assigned to a class on a random basis. However, since the decision for these children to enroll in a 
treatment or control school might be endogenous, they are excluded from the analysis. The number of 
newcomers was balanced across school types (tracking and non-tracking) at six per school on average. 
15own test score in non-tracking schools but, consistent with the discontinuous assignment 
at the 50
th percentile for most schools, there is sharp discontinuity at the 50
th percentile in 
tracking schools.
8 The baseline exams are a good measure of academic achievement, in 
that they are strongly predictive of the endline test we administered, with a correlation of 
0.47 in the non-tracking schools and 0.49 in tracking schools. In tracking schools, the top 
section has somewhat more girls and students are 0.4 years older.  
 
3.3 Data   
The sample frame consists of approximately 10,000 students enrolled in first grade in 
March 2005. The key outcome of interest is student academic achievement, as measured 
by scores on a standardized math and language test first administered in all schools 18 
months after the start of the program. Trained enumerators administered the test, which 
was then graded blindly by enumerators. In each school, 60 students (30 per section) 
were drawn from the initial sample to participate in the tests. If a section had more than 
30 students, students were randomly sampled (using a random number generated before 
enumerators visited the school) after stratifying by their position in the initial distribution. 
Part of the test was designed by a cognitive psychologist to measure a range of skills 
students might have mastered at the end of grade 2. Part of the test was written and part 
was orally administered one-to-one by trained enumerators. Students answered math and 
literacy questions ranging from identifying letters and counting to subtracting three-digit 
numbers and reading and understanding sentences.  
To limit attrition, enumerators were instructed to go to the homes of sampled students 
who had dropped out or were absent on the day of the test, and to bring them to school 
for the test. It was not always possible to find those children, however, and the attrition 
rate on the test was 18 percent.  There was no difference between tracking and non-
tracking schools in overall attrition rates. The characteristics of those who attrited are 
similar across groups, except that girls in tracking schools were less likely to attrit in the 
endline test (see appendix table 1). Transfer rates to other schools were similar in 
                                                           
8 Peer quality is slightly more similar for children below and above the 50
th percentile than for students at 
other percentiles because the assignment procedure used a manually computed ranking variable that was 
very strongly correlated with the ranking based on the actual school grades but had a few discrepancies 
(due to clerical errors). Thus, some children close to the median who should have been assigned to one 
section wound up in the other one. We are using the rank based on the actual school grade as our control 
variable in what follows, in case the ranking variable that was used for assignment was in fact manipulated.  
16tracking and non-tracking schools. In total, we have endline test score data for 5,796 
students.  
To measure whether program effects persisted, children sampled for the endline were 
tested again in November 2007, one year after the program ended. During the 2007 
school year, students were overwhelmingly enrolled in grades for which their school had 
a single section, so tracking was no longer an option. Most students had reached grade 3, 
but repeaters were also tested. The attrition for this longer-term follow-up was 22 
percent, only 4 points higher than attrition at the endline test. The proportion of attritors 
and their characteristics do not differ between the two treatment arms (appendix table 1).  
We also collected data on grade progression and dropout rates, and student and 
teacher absence. Overall, the dropout rate among grade 1 students in our sample was low 
(below 0.5 percent). Several times during the course of the study, enumerators went to 
the schools unannounced and checked, upon arrival, whether teachers were present in 
school and whether they were in class and teaching. On those visits, enumerators also 
took a roll call of the students. 
 
3.4 Empirical Strategy 
a) Measuring the Impact of Tracking 
To measure the overall impact of tracking on test scores, we run regressions of the form:   
(E1)                                                         
where yij  is the endline test score of student i in school j (expressed in standard deviations 
of the distribution of scores in the non-tracking schools),
9  Tj is a dummy equal to 1 if  
school j was tracking, and Xij is a vector including a constant and child and school control 
variables (we estimate a specification without control variables and a specification that 
controls for baseline score, whether the child was in the bottom half of the distribution in 
the school, gender, age, and whether the section is taught by a contract or civil-service 
teacher).  
To identify potential differential effects for children assigned to the lower and 
upper section, we also run:  
(E2)                                      
                                                           
9 We have also experimented with an alternative specification of the endline test score for math, which uses 
item response theory to give different weights to questions of different levels of difficulty (the format of the 
language score was not appropriate for this exercise). The results were extremely similar (results available 
from the authors) so we focus on the standardized test scores in this version.   
17where Bij  is a dummy variable that indicates whether the child was in the bottom half of 
the baseline score distribution in her school (Bij is also included  Xij). We also estimate a 
specification where treatment is interacted with the initial quartile of the child in the 
baseline distribution. Finally, to investigate flexibly whether the effects of tracking are 
different at different levels of the initial test score distribution, we run two separate non-
parametric regressions of endline test scores on baseline test scores in tracking and non-
tracking schools, and plot the results.  
To understand better how tracking works, we also run similar regressions using as 
dependent variable a more disaggregated version of the test scores: the test scores in math 
and language, and the scores on specific skills. Finally, we also run regressions of a 
similar form, using as outcome variable teacher presence in school, whether the teacher is 
in class teaching, and student presence in school.  
 
b) Non-tracking schools 
Since children were randomly assigned to a section in these schools, their peer group is 
randomly assigned and there is some naturally occurring variation in the composition of 
the groups.
10 In the sample of non-tracking schools, we start by estimating the effect of a 
student’s peer average baseline test scores by OLS (this is the average of the section 
excluding the student him or herself):  
(E3)       
where   is the average peer baseline test score in the section to which a student was 
assigned.
11 The vector of control variables Xij includes the student’s own baseline score 
xij. Since students were randomly assigned within schools, our estimate of the coefficient 
of   in a specification including school fixed effects will reflect the causal effect of 
peers’ prior achievement (both direct through peer to peer learning, and indirect through 
adjustment in teacher behavior to the extent to which teachers change behavior in 
response to small random variations in class composition). Although our model has no 
specific prediction on the impact of the variance, we also include the variance of the 
peers’ test scores, as an independent variable in one specification.  
                                                           
10 On average across schools, the difference in baseline scores between the two sections is 0.17 standard 
deviation, with a standard deviation of 0.13. The 25th-75th percentiles interval for the difference is [0.7 - 
0.24]. 
11 There were very few re-assignments, but we always focus on the initial random assignment: that is, we 
consider the test scores of the other students initially assigned to the class to which a student was initially 
assigned (regardless of whether they eventually attended that class).   
18The baseline grades are not comparable across schools (they are the grades assigned 
by the teachers in each school). However, baseline grades are strongly correlated with 
endline test scores, which are comparable across schools. Thus, to facilitate comparison 
with the literature and with the regression discontinuity estimates for the tracking 
schools, we estimate the impact of average endline peer test scores on a child’s test score:  
(E4)                                           
This equation is estimated by instrumental variables, using   as an instrument for 
. 
 
c) Measuring the Impact of Assignment to Lower or Upper Section 
Tracking schools provide a natural setup for a regression discontinuity (RD) design to 
test whether students at the median are better off being assigned to the top section, as 
would be true in the special case of the model in which teacher payoffs were linear in test 
scores.  
As shown in Figure 2, students on either side of the median were assigned to classes 
with very different average prior achievement of their classmates: the lower-scoring 
member was assigned to the bottom section, and the higher-scoring member was assigned 
to the top section. (When the class had an odd number of students, the median student 
was randomly assigned to one of the sections).  
Thus, we first estimate the following reduced form regression in tracking schools: 
(E5)                                        
where Pij is the percentile of the child on the baseline distribution in his school. 
Since assignment was based on scores within each school, we also run the same 
specification, including school fixed effects: 
(E6)                                        
To test the robustness of our estimates to various specifications of the control 
function, we also run specifications similar to equations (E5) and (E6), estimating the 
polynomial separately on each side of the discontinuity, and report the difference in test 
scores across the discontinuity. Finally, we follow Imbens and Lemieux (2007) and use a 
Fan locally weighted regression of the relationship between endline test scores and 
baseline percentile on both sides of the discontinuity.  
19Note that this is an unusually favorable setup for a regression discontinuity design.  
There are 60 different discontinuities in our data set, rather than just one, as in most 
regression discontinuity applications, and the number of different discontinuities in 
principle grows with the number of schools.
12 We can therefore run a specification 
including only the pair of students straddling the median.   
(E7)           
Since the median will be at different achievement levels in different schools, results will 
be robust to sharp non-linearities in the function linking pre- and post-test achievement.  
These reduced form results are of independent interest, and they can also be 
combined with the impact of tracking on average peer test scores for instrumental 
variable estimation of the impact of average peer achievement for the median child in a 
tracking environment. Specifically, the first stage of this regression is:  
 
where   is the average endline test scores of the classmates of student i in school j. 
The structural equation:  
(E8)                   
is estimated using Bij (whether a child was assigned to the bottom track) as an instrument 
for  .  
Note that this strategy will give an estimate of the effect of peer quality for the 
median child in a tracking environment, where having high achieving peers on average 
also means that the child is the lowest achieving child of his section (at least at baseline) 
and having low-achieving peers means that the child is the highest achieving child of his 
track.  
  
   
4. Results 
In Section 4.1, we present reduced form estimates of the impact of tracking, showing that 
tracking increased test scores throughout the distribution and thus rejecting the special 
case of the model in which higher-achieving peers raise test scores directly but there is no 
indirect effect through changing teacher behavior. In Section 4.2, we use random 
variation in peer composition in non-tracked schools to assess the implications of 
                                                           
12 Black, Galdo and Smith (2007) also exploit a series of sharp discontinuities in their estimation of a re-
employment program across various sites in Kentucky.  
20Proposition 3, and to argue that the data is not consistent with the special case of the 
model in which there are no direct effects of peers. In Section 4.3, we argue that the data 
are inconsistent with the special case of the model in which teacher incentives are linear 
in student test scores, because the median student in tracking schools scores similarly 
whether assigned to the upper or lower section. We conclude that the data is most 
consistent with a model in which peer composition affects students both directly and 
indirectly, through teacher behavior, and in which teachers face convex incentives. In this 
model, teachers teach to the top of the distribution in the absence of tracking, and 
teaching can improve learning for all children.   
 
4.1 The Impact of Tracking by Prior Achievement and the Indirect Impact of Peers 
on Teacher Behavior 
A striking result of this experiment is that tracking by initial achievement significantly 
increased test scores throughout the distribution.  
Table 2 presents the main results on the impacts of tracking. At the endline test, after 
18 months of treatment, students in tracking schools scored 0.138 standard deviations 
(with a standard error of 0.078 standard deviations) more than students in non-tracking 
schools overall (Table 2, Column 1, Panel A). The estimated effect is somewhat larger 
(0.175 standard deviations, with a standard error of 0.077 standard deviations) when 
controlling for individual-level covariates (column 2). Both sets of students, those 
assigned to the upper track and those assigned to the lower track, benefited from tracking 
(in row 2, column 3, panel A, the interaction between being in the bottom half and in a 
tracking school cannot be distinguished from zero, and the total effect for the bottom half 
is 0.155 standard deviations, with a p value of 0.04). When we look at each quartile of the 
initial distribution separately, we find positive point estimates for all quartiles (column 4). 
Figure 3 provides graphical evidence suggesting that all students benefited from 
tracking. As in Lee (2008), it plots a student’s endline test score as a function of the 
baseline test score using a second-order polynomial estimated separately on either side of 
the cutoff in both the tracking and non-tracking schools. Both in language and math, 
tracking increases test scores regardless of the child’s initial test score in the distribution 
of test scores.  
Overall, the estimated effect of tracking is relatively large. It is similar in magnitude 
to the effect of being assigned to a contract teacher (shown in Row 6 of Table 4), who, as 
21we will show in Table 6, exerted much higher levels of effort than civil-service teachers. 
It is also interesting to contrast the effect of tracking with that of a more commonly 
proposed reform, class size reduction. In other contexts, studies have found a positive and 
significant effect of class size reduction on test scores (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Krueger 
and Whitmore, 2002). In Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2009), however, we find that in the 
same exact context, class size reduction per se (without a change in teachers’ incentive) 
generates an increase in test scores of 0.09 standard deviation after 18 months (though 
insignificant), but the effect completely disappears within one year after the class size 
reduction stops. 
The program effect persisted beyond the duration of the program. When the program 
ended after 18 months, three quarters of students had then reached grade 3, and in all 
schools except five, there was only one class for grade 3. The remaining students had 
repeated and were in grade 2 where, once again, most schools had only one section (since 
after the end of the program they did not have funds for additional teachers). Thus, after 
the program ended, students in our sample were not tracked any more (and they were in 
larger classes than both tracked and non-tracked students had experienced in grade 1 and 
2).  Yet, one year later, test scores of students in tracking schools were still 0.163 
standard deviations greater (with a standard error of 0.069 standard deviations) than those 
of students in non-tracking schools overall (Table 2, column 1, panel B). The effect is 
slightly larger (0.178 standard deviations) and more significant with control variables 
(column 2, panel B), and the gains persist both for initially high and low achieving 
children. A year after the end of the program, the effect for the bottom half is still large 
(0.135 standard deviations, with a p-value of 0.09), although the effect for students in the 
bottom quartile is insignificant (Panel B, column 4).  
This overall persistence is striking, since in many evaluations, the test score effects of 
even successful interventions tend to fade over time (e.g., Banerjee, et al., 2007; Andrabi, 
et al., 2008). This indicates that tracking may have helped students master core skills in 
grades 1 and 2 and that this may have helped them learn more later on.
13   
                                                           
13 We also find (in results not reported here to save space) that initially low-achieving girls in tracking 
school are 4 percentage points less likely to repeat grade 1. Since the program continued in grade 2, 
students who repeated lost the advantage of being in a small class, and of being more likely to be taught by 
a contract teacher. Part of the effect of tracking after the end of grade 1 may be due to this. In the 
companion paper, we estimate the effect of the class size reduction program in non-tracking schools to be 
0.16 standard deviations on average. At most, the repetition effect would therefore explain an increase in 
0.04*0.16=0.0064 standard deviations in test scores. Furthermore, it is present only for girls, while tracking 
affects both boys and girls.  
22Under Proposition 1, this evidence of gains throughout the distribution is inconsistent 
with the special case of the model in which pupils do not affect each other indirectly 
through teacher behavior but only directly, with all pupils benefiting from higher scoring 
classmates. 
Table 3 tests for heterogeneity in the effect of tracking. We present the estimated 
effect of tracking separately for boys and girls in panel A. Although the coefficients are 
not significantly different from each other, point estimates suggest that the effects are 
larger for girls in math (panel A). For both boys and girls, initially weaker students 
benefit as much as initially stronger students. 
Panel B present differential effects for students taught by civil-service teachers and 
contract teachers in panel B. This distinction is important, since the impact of tracking 
could be affected by teacher response, and contract and civil-service teachers have 
different experience and incentives.  
While tracking increases test scores for students at all levels of the pre-test 
distribution assigned to be taught by contract teachers (indeed, initially low-scoring 
students assigned to a contract teachers benefited even more from tracking than initially 
high-scoring students), initially low-scoring students did not benefit from tracking if 
assigned to a civil-service teacher. In contrast, tracking substantially increased scores for 
initially high-scoring students assigned to a civil-service teacher. Below, we will present 
evidence that this may be because tracking led civil-service teachers to increase effort 
when they were assigned to the high-scoring students, but not when assigned to the low-
scoring students, while contract teachers exert high effort in all situations. This is 
consistent with the idea that the cost of effort rises very steeply as a certain effort level is 
approached. Contract teachers are close to this level of effort in any case, and therefore 
have little scope to increase their effort, while civil service teachers have more such 
scope.  
 
4.2 Random Variation in Peer Composition and the Direct Effect of Peers 
The local random variation in peer quality in non-tracking schools helps us test whether 
the opposite special case in which peers affect each other only indirectly, through their 
impact on teacher behavior, but not directly, can also be rejected.  
Recall that Proposition 3 implies that the impact of a uniform increase in peer 
achievement on students at different level of the distribution depends on whether or not 
23there are direct peer effects. Namely, a uniform increase in peer achievement increases 
test scores at the top of the distribution in all cases, but effects on students in the middle 
and at the bottom of the distribution depend on whether there are also direct, positive 
effects of high achieving peers. In the presence of such effects, the impact on students in 
the middle of the distribution is ambiguous, while for those at the bottom it is positive, 
albeit weaker than the effects at the top of the distribution. In the absence of such direct 
effects, there is a negative impact on students in the middle of the distribution and no 
impact at the bottom.  
The random allocation of students between the two sections in non-tracking schools 
generated substantial random variation which allows us to test those implications: on 
average across schools, to assess these implications the difference in baseline scores 
between the two classes is 0.17 standard deviations, with a standard deviation of 0.14, 
and the 25
th-75
th percentiles interval for the difference is [0.7 - 0.24].
 14  We can thus 
implement methods to evaluate the impact of class composition similar to those 
introduced by Hoxby (2000), with the difference that we use actual random variation in 
peer group composition, but have lower sample size. The results are presented in Table 4. 
Similar approaches are proposed by Boozer et al. (2001) in the context of the STAR 
experiment and Lyle (2007) for West Point Cadets, who are randomly assigned to a 
group of peers.  
On average students benefit from stronger peers: the coefficient on the average 
baseline test score is 0.35 with a standard error of 0.15 (Table 4 panel A, column 1). This 
coefficient is not comparable with other estimates in the literature since we are using the 
school grade sheets, which are not comparable across schools, and so we are 
standardizing the baseline scores in each school. Thus, in panel B, we use the average 
baseline scores of peers to instrument for their average endline score (the first stage is 
presented in panel C). If effects were linear, column 1 would imply that one standard 
deviation increase in average peer endline test score would increase the test score of a 
student by 0.52 standard deviations, an effect comparable to that usually found in 
previous literature, with the exception of Lyle (2007), which finds insignificant peer 
effects with a similar strategy.
15  
                                                           
14 We used only the initial assignment (which was random) in all specifications, not the section the student 
eventually attended. 
15 Of course, these estimates come from variations in peer test scores that are smaller than one standard 
deviation and, the extrapolation to one standard deviation may not actually be legitimate: the linear 
24More interestingly, as shown in columns 6 to 8, the data are consistent with 
Proposition 3 in the presence of direct peer effects – the estimated effect is 0.9 standard 
deviations in the top quartile; insignificant and negative in the middle two quartiles, and 
0.5 standard deviations in the bottom quartile. The data thus suggest that peers affect each 
other both directly and indirectly.
16 
 
4.3 Are Teacher Incentives Linear? The Impact of Assignment to Lower vs. Upper 
Section:  Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Students near the Median 
Recall from proposition 7 that under a linear payoff schedule for teachers, the median 
student will be equidistant from the target teaching level in the upper and lower sections, 
but will have higher-achieving peers and therefore perform better in the upper section. 
Under a concave payoff schedule, teacher effort will be greater in the lower section but 
the median student will be better matched to the target teaching level in the upper section, 
potentially creating offsetting effects. Finally, if teacher payoffs are convex in student test 
scores, the median student will be closer to the target teaching level in the lower section 
but on the other hand will have lower-achieving peers and experience lower teacher 
effort. These effects go in opposite directions, so that the resulting impact of the section 
in which the median child is assigned is ambiguous. In this section, we present regression 
discontinuity estimates of the impact of assignment to the lower or upper section for 
students near the median in tracking schools. We argue that the test score data are 
inconsistent with linear payoffs but consistent with the possibility that teachers face a 
convex payoff function and focus on students at the top of the distribution. (Later, we 
rule out the concave case.)  
The main thrust of the regression discontinuity estimates of peer effects are shown in 
Figure 3, discussed above. As is apparent from the figure, there is no discontinuity in test 
scores at the 50
th percentile cutoff in the tracking schools, despite the strong discontinuity 
                                                                                                                                                                             
approximation is valid only locally. However, presenting the results in term of the impact of a one standard 
deviation change in peers’ test scores allows us to compare our results to that of the literature, which also 
uses local variation in average test scores, and generally expresses the results in terms of the impact of one 
standard deviation increase in average test scores. Note that even with this normalization, the results are not 
quite comparable to those of paper who estimate the effect of a standard deviation in average baseline test 
scores on endline test scores: those results would be scaled down, relative to the ones we present here, by 
the size of the relationship between baseline and endline scores.  
16 Controlling for the standard deviation of the test scores (column 2) does not change the estimated effect 
of the mean, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the standard deviation of scores itself has no effect, 
though the standard errors are large.   
25in peer baseline scores observed in Figure 2 (a difference of 1.6 standard deviations in the 
baseline scores). The relationship is continuous and smooth throughout the distribution.
17  
  A variety of regression specifications show no significant effect of students near the 
median of the distribution being assigned to the bottom half of the class in tracking 
schools (Table 5, panel A).  Columns 1 and 2 present estimates of equations (E5) and 
(E6), respectively: the endline test score is regressed on a cubic of original percentile of a 
child in the distribution in his school, and a dummy for whether he is in the bottom half 
of the class. Column 6 presents estimates of equation (E7), and column 7 adds a school 
fixed effect. To assess the robustness of these results, columns 3 through 5 specify the 
control function in the regression discontinuity design estimates in two other ways: 
column 5 follows Imbens and Lemieux (2007) and shows a Fan locally weighted 
regression on each side of the discontinuity.
18 The specifications in columns 3 and 4 are 
similar to equations (E5) and (E6), but the cubic is replaced by a quadratic allowed to be 
different on both sides of the discontinuity. The results confirm what the graphs show: 
despite the big gap in average peer achievement, the marginal students’ final test scores 
do not seem to be significantly affected by assignment to the bottom section.  
Panel B shows instrumental variable estimates of the impact of classmates’ average 
test score. We use the average endline score of classmates (because the baseline scores 
are school specific), and instrument it using the dummy for being in the “bottom half” of 
the initial distribution. The first stage is shown in panel C, and shows that the average 
endline test scores of a child’s classmates are about 0.76 standard deviations lower if she 
was assigned to the bottom section in a tracking school. The IV estimates in panel B are 
all small and insignificant. For example the specification in column 2, which has school 
fixed effects and uses all the data, suggests that an increase in one standard deviation in 
the classmates’ average test score reduces a child’s test score by 0.002 standard 
deviations, a point estimate extremely close to zero. The 95 percent confidence interval in 
this specification is [-0.21; 0.21]. Thus, we are able to reject at 95 percent confidence 
                                                           
17 This result is robust to a series of specifications. When we use a linear fit, rather than a polynomial, we 
again do not see an effect of the section in which the students were placed for students in the middle of the 
distribution (figure not shown). In Appendix Figure A1, we reproduce Figure 3 with a quadratic fit for total 
score in Panel A and also find no discontinuity. We use a Fan locally-weighted regression with a biweight 
kernel and a bandwidth of 2.0 in Panel B, and we again see no discontinuity at the threshold for being 
assigned to the bottom track. 
18 Since the result is completely insensitive to the choice of bandwidth, we do not implement the cross-
validation strategy they recommend. 
26reasonably modest overall effects of peer average test scores on the median child’s test 
score in a tracking environment.
19  
  Overall, these regression discontinuity results allow us to reject the third special case, 
in which teacher have linear incentives and consequently target the median child in the 
distribution of the class.  
  Taken together, the test scores results are consistent with a model in which students 
influence each other both directly and indirectly through teacher behavior, and teachers 
face convex payoffs in pupils’ test scores, and thus tend to target their teaching to the top 
of the class. This model can help us interpret our main finding that tracking benefits all 
students: for higher-achieving students, tracking implies stronger peers and higher 
teacher effort, while for lower-achieving students, tracking implies a level of instruction 
that better matches their need.  However, we have not yet rejected the possibility that 
teacher payoffs are concave in student test scores. Recall that under concavity, students in 
the bottom half of the distribution may gain from greater teacher effort under tracking 
(proposition 6). The next section examines data on teacher behavior, arguing that it is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that teacher payoffs are concave in student test scores, 
but consistent with the hypothesis that payoffs are convex in student scores..  
 
5.  Teacher Response to Tracking 
This section reports on tests of implications on the model related to teacher behavior. 
Subsection 5.1 argues that the evidence on teacher behavior is consistent with the idea 
that teachers face convex payoffs incentives in pupil test scores and inconsistent with the 
hypothesis of concavity. Subsection 5.2 presents some evidence that the patterns of 
changes in test scores are consistent with the hypothesis that teachers change their focus 
teaching level  , in response to tracking. 
 
5.1 Teacher Effort and the Curvature of the Teacher Payoff Function 
Estimates of the impact of tracking on teacher’s effort are presented in Table 6. Our 
measure of teacher effort is whether the teacher was present in school during 
unannounced visits, and whether she was found in class and teaching.  
                                                           
19 With the caveat, mentioned above, that there may be a direct impact of one’s rank in the class, which 
would violate the identification assumption that the only channel of impact of being assigned to the lower 
section is through classmates’ average score.  
27Recall that the model does not yield a clear prediction for whether tracking should 
increase or decrease teacher effort overall. However, the model predicts that the effort 
level might vary across sections (upper or lower) under tracking. Namely, proposition 6 
implies that if teacher payoffs are convex in student test scores, then teachers assigned to 
the top section in tracking schools should exert more effort than those assigned to the 
bottom section. On the other hand, if payoffs are concave in student test scores, teachers 
should put in more effort in the lower section than the upper section. 
We find that teachers in tracking schools are significantly more likely both to be in 
school and to be in class teaching than those in non-tracking schools (Table 6, columns 1 
and 2).
20 Overall, teachers in tracking schools are 9.6 percentage points (19 percent) more 
likely to be found in school and teaching during a random spot check than their 
counterparts in non-tracking schools. However, the negative coefficient on the interaction 
term between “tracking” and “bottom half” shows that teacher effort in tracking schools 
is higher in the upper section than the lower sections, consistent with the hypothesis that 
teacher payoffs are convex in student test scores. 
Recall that the model also suggests that if teachers face strong enough incentives 
(high enough λ) then the impact of tracking on their effort will be smaller because they 
have less scope to increase effort. To test this, we explore the impact of tracking on 
teacher effort separately for civil-service teachers and new contract teachers, who face 
very different incentives. Contract teachers are on short-term (one year) contracts, and 
have incentives to work hard to increase their chances both of having their short-term 
contracts renewed, and of eventually being hired as civil-service teachers. In contrast, the 
civil service teachers have high job security and promotion depends only weakly on 
performance. Civil service teachers thus may have more scope to increase effort. 
  We find that the contract teachers attend more than the civil-service teachers, are 
more likely to be found in class and teaching (74 percent versus 45 percent for the civil-
service teacher), and their absence rate is unaffected by tracking. In contrast, the civil-
service teachers are 5.4 percentage points more likely to be in school in tracking schools 
than in non-tracking schools when they were assigned to the top section, and the 
difference is significant (recall that teacher assignment to each section was random, so 
this is indeed the causal effect of being assigned to a group of strong students, rather than 
                                                           
20 The specification is similar to equation (E2), though the set of control variables includes teacher age and 
experience teaching.  
 
28a non-tracked group). However, the difference disappears entirely for civil-service 
teachers assigned to the bottom section: the interaction between tracking and bottom 
section is minus 7.7 percentage points, and is also significant. The effect is even stronger 
for finding teachers in their classrooms: overall, these civil-service teachers are 11 
percentage points more likely to be in class and teaching when they are assigned to the 
top section in tracking schools than when they are assigned to non-tracking schools. This 
represents a 25 percent increase in teaching time. When civil-service teachers are 
assigned to the bottom section, they are about as likely to be teaching as their 
counterparts in non-tracking schools. Students’ attendance is not affected by tracking or 
by the section they were assigned to (column 10).  
 These results on teacher effort also shed light on the differential impact of tracking 
across students observed in Table 3. Recall that among students who were assigned to 
civil service teachers, tracking created a larger test score increase in the top section than 
in the bottom section, but this was not the case for students of contract teachers. What the 
effort data shows is that, for students of civil service teachers, the tracking effect is larger 
for the upper stream because they benefit not only from (potentially) more appropriate 
teaching and better peers, but also from higher effort. For students of contract teachers, 
the “higher effort” margin is absent.   
 
5.2 Adjustment in the level of teaching and effects on different skills  
The model suggests teachers may adjust the level at which they teach in response to 
changes in class composition. For example, a teacher assigned students with low initial 
achievement might begin with more basic material and instruct at a slower pace, 
providing more repetition and reinforcement. With a group of initially higher achieving 
students, the teacher can increase the complexity of the tasks and pupils can learn at a 
faster pace. Teachers with a heterogeneous class may teach at a relatively high level that 
is inappropriate for most students, especially those at the bottom.  
  While we unfortunately do not have direct evidence on the material teachers covered, 
Table 7 reports specifications similar to equation (E2), but with test scores disaggregated 
by specific skill for math and language. The differential impact of tracking on strong and 
weak student’s mastery of easy and hard material is consistent with the hypothesis that 
teachers adjusted their teaching to fit their classroom’s composition.  The equations are 
estimated jointly in a simultaneous equation framework (allowing for correlation between 
29the error terms). There is no clear pattern for language, but the estimates for math suggest 
that, while the total effect of tracking on children initially in the bottom half of the 
distribution (thus assigned to the bottom section in the tracking schools) is significantly 
positive for all levels of difficulty, these children gained from tracking more than other 
students on the easiest questions and less on the more difficult questions. The interaction 
“tracking times bottom half” is positive for the easiest skills, and negative for the hardest 
skills. A chi-square test allows us to reject equality of the coefficients of the interaction in 
the “easy skills” regression and the “difficult skills” regression at the 5 percent level. 
Conversely, students assigned to the upper section benefited less on the easiest questions, 
and more on the difficult questions (in fact, they did not significantly benefit from 
tracking for the easiest questions, but they did significantly benefit from it for the hardest 
questions).  
  Overall, this table provides suggestive evidence that tracking allowed teachers the 
opportunity to focus on the skills that children had not yet mastered, although the 
estimates are not very precise.
21 An alternative explanation for these results, however, is 
that weak students stood to gain from any program on the easiest skills (since they had 
not mastered them yet, and in 18 months they did not have time to master both easy and 
strong skills), while strong students had already mastered them and would have benefited 
from any program at the skills they had not already mastered. The ordinal nature of test 
score data makes regression interaction terms difficult to interpret definitively, which 
further weakens the evidence.  
      
5. Conclusion 
This paper provides experimental evidence that students at all level of the initial 
achievement spectrum benefited from being tracked into classes by initial achievement. 
Despite the critical importance of this issue for the educational policy both in developed 
and developing countries, there is surprisingly little rigorous evidence addressing it, and 
                                                           
21 We estimated a version of equation (E2) allowing the effect to vary by quarter of the distribution for each 
skill, and the patterns are very similar, with progressively weaker students benefiting the most from 
tracking for the easiest skills, and progressively stronger students benefiting the most for the hardest skills. 
We also estimated a version of equation (E2) separately by teacher type. We find that the effects observed 
in Table 7 are much stronger for students assigned to contract teachers than for those assigned to civil-
service teachers. This is because lower section students assigned to the civil-service teachers did not benefit 
from tracking, as seen in Table 3. 
30to our knowledge this paper provides the first experimental evaluation of the impact of 
tracking in any context, and the only rigorous evidence in a developing country context. 
  After 18 months, the point estimates suggest that the average score of a student in a 
tracking school is 0.14 standard deviations higher than that of a student in a non-tracking 
school. These effects are persistent. One year after the program ended, students in 
tracking schools performed 0.16 standard deviations higher than those in non-tracking 
schools.  
Moreover, tracking raised scores for students throughout the initial distribution of 
student achievement. A regression discontinuity design approach reveals that students 
who were very close to the 50
th percentile of the initial distribution within their school 
scored similarly on the endline exam whether they were assigned to the top or bottom 
section. In each case, they did much better than their counterparts in non-tracked schools.  
We also find that students in non-tracking schools scored higher if they were 
randomly assigned to peers with higher initial scores. This effect was very strong for 
students at the top of the distribution, absent for students in the middle of the distribution 
and positive but not as strong at the bottom of the distribution. Together, these results 
suggest that peers affect students both directly and indirectly by influencing teacher 
behavior, in particular teacher effort and choice of target teaching level. Under the model, 
the impact of tracking will depend on teachers’ incentives, but in a context in which 
teachers have convex payoffs in student test scores, tracking can lead them to refocus 
attention closer to the median student. 
These conclusions echo those reached by Borman and Hewes (2002), who find 
positive short- and long-term impacts of “Success for All.” One of the components of this 
program, first piloted in the United States by elementary schools in Baltimore, Maryland, 
is to regroup students across grades for reading lessons targeted to specific performance 
levels for a few hours a day. Likewise, Banerjee, et al. (2007), who study a remedial 
education and computer-assisted learning programs in India, found that both programs 
were very effective, mainly because they allowed students to learn at their own levels of 
achievement. Finally, our results match those of Zimmer (2003), who finds that, in the 
US, tracking has overall a positive effect on lower-achieving students, for whom the 
benefit of having more tailored instruction under tracking offsets the reduction in peer 
quality.  
31A central challenge of educational systems in developing countries is that students are 
extremely diverse, and the curriculum is largely not adapted to new learners. These 
results show that grouping students by preparedness or prior achievement and focusing 
the teaching material at a level pertinent for them could potentially have large positive 
effects with little or no additional resource cost.  
Our results may have implications for debates over school choice and voucher 
systems. A central criticism of such programs is that they may wind up hurting some 
students if they lead to increased sorting of students by initial academic achievement and 
if all students benefit from having peers with higher initial achievement. Furthermore, 
tracking in public school would affect the equilibrium under these programs. Epple, 
Newton and Romano (2002) study theoretically how tracking in public schools would 
affect the decision of private schools to track students, and the welfare of high and low 
achieving students. They find that, if the only effect of tracking was through the direct 
effects of the peer group, tracking in public schools would increase enrollment and raise 
average achievement in public schools, but that high achieving students would benefit at 
the expense of low achieving students. Our results suggest that, at least in some 
circumstances, tracking can potentially benefit all students, which would have 
implication for the school choice equilibrium in contexts with school choices.  
Note that since teachers were randomly assigned to each section and class size was 
also constant, resources were similar for non-tracked classes and the lower and upper- 
sections under tracking. However, in other contexts, policy makers or school officials 
could target more resources to either the weaker or stronger students. Piketty (2004) notes 
that tracking could allow more resources to be devoted to weaker students, promoting 
catch up of weaker students. Compensatory policies of this type are not unusual in 
developed countries, but in some developed countries and almost all developing 
countries, more resources are devoted to stronger students, consistent with the 
assumption of convex payoffs to test scores in the theoretical framework above. Indeed, 
even in developed countries, the best teachers are often assigned to the stronger students.  
If the best teachers are assigned to the highest achieving students, the initially lower 
achieving students could be hurt by tracking, so caution is needed in generalizing from 
these results in which teacher ability was held constant between tracking and non-
32tracking schools.
22  Of course tendencies for strong teachers to seek high-achieving, 
students could perhaps be mitigated if evaluations of a teacher’s performance were on a 
value-added basis, rather than based on endline scores.  
It is an open question whether similar results would be obtained in different contexts. 
The model provides some evidence on features of the context that are likely to affect the 
impact of tracking: initial heterogeneity, high scope to increase teacher effort (at least 
through increase presence) and the relative incentives teachers face to teach low- and 
high-achieving students. For example, in a system where the incentive is to focus on the 
weakest students, and there is not much scope to adjust teacher effort, tracking could 
have very strong positive effect on high achievement students, and weak or even negative 
effect on weak students, who would lose strong peers without the benefit of getting more 
appropriately focused instruction. Going beyond the model, it seems reasonable to think 
that the impact of tracking might also depend on availability of extra resources to help 
teachers deal with different types of students (such as remedial education, teacher aides, 
lower pupil to teacher ratio, computer-assisted learning, and special education programs). 
We believe that tracking might be reasonably likely to have a similar impact in other 
low income countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where the student 
population is often heterogeneous, and the educational system rewards teachers for 
progress at the top of the distribution. Our reduced form results may not apply to the US 
or other developed countries where teachers’ incentives may differ. However, we hope 
that our analysis may still provide useful insights to predict the situations in which 
tracking may or may not be beneficial in these countries, and on the type of experiments 
that would shed light on this question.  
 
                                                           
22 Note, however, that in our setting it seems likely that if choice had been allowed, the more powerful 
teachers would have been assigned to the stronger group, and since the more powerful teachers the civil-
service teachers, who also happen to be the worst teachers, this would have benefited the weak students.  
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Figure 2: Experimental Variation in Peer Composition 
Non-Tracking vs. Tracking Schools 
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38Figure A1: Peer Quality and Endline Scores in Tracking Schools 
Panel A. Quadratic Fit 
 
Notes: the points are the average score. The fitted values are from regressions that include a second order polynomial 
estimated separately on each side of the percentile=50 threshold. 
 
Panel B. Fan Locally-Weighted regression 
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Panel A. Baseline School Characteristics Mean  SD Mean  SD
Total enrollment in 2004 589 232 549 198 0.316
Number of government teachers in 2004 11.6 3.3 11.9 2.8 0.622
School pupil/teacher ratio 37.1 12.2 35.9 10.1 0.557
Performance at national exam in 2004 (out of 400) 255.6 23.6 258.1 23.4 0.569
Panel B. Class Size Prior to Program Inception (March 2005)
Average class size in first grade 91 37 89 33 0.764
Proportion of female first grade students 0.49 0.06 0.49 0.05 0.539
Average class size in second grade 96 41 91 35 0.402
Panel C. Class Size 6 Months After Program Inception (October 2005)
Average class size in first grade 44 18 42 15 0.503
Range of class sizes in sample (first grade) 19-98 20-97
Panel D. Class Size in Year 2 of Program (March 2006)
Average class size in second grade 42 17 42 20 0.866
Range of class sizes in sample (second grade) 18-93 21-95
Number of Schools 61 60 121
P-value 
Top = Bottom
Panel E. Comparability of two sections within Tracking Schools Mean  SD Mean  SD
Proportion Female 0.49 0.09 0.50 0.08 0.38
Average Age at Endline 9.04 0.59 9.41 0.60 0.00
Average Standardized Baseline Score (Mean 0, SD 1 at school level) -0.81 0.04 0.81 0.04 0.00
Average Std. Dev. Within Section in Standardized Baseline Scores 0.49 0.13 0.65 0.13 0.00
Average Standardized Endline Score (Mean 0, SD 1 in Non-Tracking group) -0.15 0.44 0.69 0.58 0.00
Average Std. Dev. Within Section in Standardized Endline Scores 0.77 0.23 0.88 0.20 0.00
Assigned to Contract teacher 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.44
Respected Assignment 0.99 0.02 0.99 0.02 0.67
P-value 
A = B
Panel F. Comparability of two sections within Non-Tracking Schools
Proportion Female 0.49 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.89
Average Age at Endline 9.07 0.53 9.00 0.45 0.45
Average Standardized Baseline Score (Mean 0, SD 1 at school level) 0.003 0.10 0.002 0.11 0.94
Average Std. Dev. Within Section in Standardized Baseline Scores 1.005 0.08 0.993 0.08 0.43
Average Standardized Endline Score (Mean 0, SD 1 in Non-Tracking group) 0.188 0.46 0.047 0.48 0.10
Average Std. Dev. Within Section in Standardized Endline Scores 0.937 0.24 0.877 0.24 0.16
Notes: School averages. 
Assigned to Bottom 
Section
















40(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Short-Run Effects (after 18 months in program)
(1) Tracking School 0.139 0.176 0.192 0.182 0.125 0.159 0.139 0.156 0.123 0.155 0.198 0.166
(0.078)* (0.077)** (0.093)** (0.093)* (0.065)* (0.064)** (0.073)* (0.083)* (0.08) (0.083)* (0.108)* (0.098)*
(2) In Bottom Half of Initial Distribution -0.036 0.04 -0.091
   x Tracking School (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
(3) In Bottom Quarter -0.045 0.012 -0.083
   x Tracking School (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
(4) In Second to Bottom Quarter -0.013 0.026 -0.042
   x Tracking School (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
(5) In Top Quarter 0.027 -0.026 0.065
   x Tracking School (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
(6) Assigned to Contract Teacher 0.181 0.18 0.18 0.162 0.16 0.161 0.16 0.16 0.16
(0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.037)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)***
Individual Controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Observations 5795 5279 5279 5279 5796 5280 5280 5280 5796 5280 5280 5280
Total effects on bottom half and bottom quarter
Coeff (Row 1)+Coeff (Row 2) 0.156 0.179 0.107
Coeff (Row 1)+Coeff (Row 3) 0.137 0.168 0.083
p-value (Total Effect for Bottom = 0) 0.038 0.095 0.016 0.049 0.127 0.237
p-value (Effect for Top quarter = Effect for Bottom Quarter) 0.507 0.701 0.209
Panel B: Longer-Run Effects (a year after program ended)
(1) Tracking School 0.163 0.178 0.216 0.235 0.128 0.131 0.143 0.168 0.16 0.18 0.231 0.241
(0.069)** (0.073)** (0.079)*** (0.088)*** (0.059)** (0.062)** (0.064)** (0.075)** (0.075)** (0.078)** (0.089)** (0.096)**
(2) In Bottom Half of Initial Distribution -0.081 -0.027 -0.106
   x Tracking School (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
(3) In Bottom Quarter -0.117 -0.042 -0.152
   x Tracking School (0.09) (0.10) (0.085)*
(4) In Second to Bottom Quarter -0.096 -0.073 -0.091
   x Tracking School (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
(5) In Top Quarter -0.028 -0.04 -0.011
   x Tracking School (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
(6) Assigned to Contract Teacher 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.062 0.061 0.061 0.102 0.102 0.103
(0.032)*** (0.032)*** (0.032)*** (0.031)** (0.031)** (0.031)** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)***
Individual Controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Observations 5490 5001 5001 5001 5490 5001 5001 5001 5496 5007 5007 5007
Total effects on bottom half and bottom quarter
Coeff (Row 1)+Coeff (Row 2) 0.135 0.116 0.125
Coeff (Row 1)+Coeff (Row 3) 0.118 0.126 0.089
p-value (Total Effect for Bottom = 0) 0.091 0.229 0.122 0.216 0.117 0.319
p-value (Effect for Top quarter = Effect for Bottom Quarter) 0.365 0.985 0.141
Notes: The sample includes 60 tracking and 61 non-tracking schools. The dependent variables are normalized test scores, with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the non-tracking schools. Robust
standard errors clustered at the school level are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Individual controls included: age, gender, being
assigned to the contract teacher, dummies for initial half/quarter, and initial attainment percentile. We lose observations when adding individual controls because information on the initial attainment
could not be collected in some of the non-tracking schools.
Mathematics Score Literacy Score
Table 2: Overall Effect of Tracking
Total Score
41Test (Top = Bottom) Test (Top = Bottom)
Bottom Half Top Half p-value Bottom Half Top Half p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: By Gender
Boys 0.130 0.162 0.731 0.084 0.206 0.168
(0.076)* (0.100) (0.083) (0.084)**
Girls 0.188 0.222 0.661 0.190 0.227 0.638
(0.089)** (0.104)** (0.098)* (0.089)**
Test (Boys = Girls): p-value 0.417 0.470 0.239 0.765
Panel B: By Teacher Type
Regular Teacher 0.048 0.225 0.155 0.086 0.198 0.329
(0.088) (0.120)* (0.099) (0.098)**
Contract Teacher 0.255 0.164 0.518 0.181 0.246 0.605
(0.099)** (0.118) (0.094)* (0.103)**
Test (Regular = Contract): p-value 0.076 0.683 0.395 0.702
Notes: The sample includes 60 tracking and 61 non-tracking schools. The dependent variables are normalized test scores, with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the non-
tracking schools. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Individual controls included: age, gender, being assigned to the contract teacher, dummies for initial half, and initial attainment percentile.
Effect of Tracking on Total 
Score for
Effect of Tracking on Total 
Score for
Table 3
Testing for Heterogeneity in Effect of Tracking on Total Score







Math Score Lit Score Total Score Total Score Total Score
(1) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Reduced Form
Average Baseline Score of Classmates
‡ 0.346 0.323 0.293 -0.052 0.505 0.893
     (0.150)** (0.160)** (0.131)** (0.227) (0.199)** (0.330)***
Observations 2188 2188 2188 2188 2188 2188
School Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Panel B: IV
Average Endline Score of Classmates 0.445 0.47 0.423 -0.063 0.855 1.052
  (predicted) (0.117)*** (0.124)*** (0.120)*** (0.306) (0.278)*** (0.368)***
Observations 2188 2188 2189 1091 524 573
School Fixed Effects x x x x x x













Average (Standardized) Baseline Score 0.768 0.680 0.691 0.795 0.757 0.794
     of Classmates
‡
(0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.030)*** (0.056)*** (0.066)*** (0.070)***
Notes: Sample restricted to the 61 non-tracking schools (where students were randomly assigned to a section). Individual controls included but not shown: gender,
age, being assigned to the contract teacher, and own baseline score. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
‡This variable has a mean of 0.0009 and a standard deviation of 0.1056. We define classmates as follows: two students in the same section are classmates; two
students in the same grade but different sections are not classmates.
Table 4
Peer Quality: Exogenous Variation in Peer Quality (Non-Tracking Schools Only)
ALL
Total Score
43(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Reduced Form
Estimated Effect of Bottom Section 0.010 0.001 -0.045 -0.051 0.088 0.034 0.027
          at 50th percentile (0.093) (0.079) (0.106) (0.089) (0.006) (0.136) (0.145)
Observations (Students) 2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 149 149
School Fixed Effects no yes no yes no no yes
Panel B: IV
Mean Total score of Peers -0.012 -0.002 -0.068 -0.004
                            (0.117) (0.106) (0.205) (0.277)
Observations (Students) 2959 2959 149 149
School Fixed Effects no yes no yes
Panel C: First Stage for IV
In Bottom Half of Initial Distribution -0.731 -0.743 -0.612 -0.607
(0.047)*** (0.021)*** (0.090)*** (0.058)***
Observations (Students) 2959 2959 149 149
R-squared 0.42 0.78 0.25 0.57
School Fixed Effects no yes no yes
Table 5
Peer Quality: Regression Discontinuity Approach (Tracking Schools Only)
 Total Score
Specification 2: 
With second order 
polynomial in baseline 
attainment estimated 
separately on either side
Specification 4: 
Pair around the median
Specification 1: 
With third order polynomial 
in baseline attainment
Notes: Sample restricted to the 60 tracking schools (where students were tracked into two sections by initial attainmnent). Students in the bottom half of the
initial distribution were assigned to the "bottom section" where the average peer quality was much lower than in the top section (see Figure 2). 
Panel A, columns 1-2 and 6-7: the score was regressed on a dummy "assigned to bottom section" and individual controls (age, gender, dummy for being
assigned to contract teacher and, for columns 1 and 2, a polynomial in initial percentile). We present the estimated coefficient of the dummy "assignedt o
bottom section". Standard errors clustered at school level.  ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A, columns 3-5: The estimated effect of being assigned to the bottom section is the difference between the estimates of the expectation function
estimated separately on either side of the 50th percentile. In columns 3-4, the score was regressed on a second order polynomial in initial percentile fully
interacted with a dummy for "bottom section". In column 5, the score was estimated through local linear regression (bandwidth = 2). Bootstrapped standard
errors clustered at the school level. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Regressions in columns 6-7 include 1 pair of students per school: The top student in the bottom section and the bottom student in the top section. The
number of observations is greater than 120 due to ties in some schools. 
In Panel B, the mean score of class peers is instrumented by the dummy "In bottom half of initial distribution" and controls.
Dep. Var: 
Average Total Score of 
Peers
Dep. Var: 
Average Total Score of 
Peers
Specification 3: 









































Student found in 
school on random 
school day
Tracking School 0.041 0.096 0.054 0.112 -0.009 0.007 -0.015
(0.021)** (0.038)** (0.025)** (0.044)** (0.034) (0.045) (0.014)
Bottom Half x Tracking School -0.049 -0.062 -0.073 -0.076 0.036 -0.004 0.003
   (0.029)* (0.040) (0.034)** (0.053) (0.046) (0.057) (0.007)
Years of Experience Teaching 0.000 -0.005 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.008
(0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.001) (0.003) (0.008)
Female -0.023 0.012 -0.004 0.101 -0.034 -0.061 -0.005
(0.018) (0.026) (0.020) (0.031)*** (0.032) (0.043) (0.004)
Assigned to Contract Teacher 0.011
(0.005)**
Assigned to Contract Teacher 0.004
      x Tracking School (0.008)
Observations 2098 2098 1633 1633 465 465 44059
Mean in Non-Tracking Schools 0.837 0.510 0.825 0.450 0.888 0.748 0.865
F (test of joint significance) 2.718 9.408 2.079 5.470 2.426 3.674 5.465
p-value 0.011 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.023 0.001 0.000
Table 6
Teacher Effort and Student Presence
Notes: The sample includes 60 tracking and 61 non-tracking schools. Linear probability model regressions. Multiple observations per teacher and per student. Standard errors
clustered at school level. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Region and date of test dummies were included in all regressions but are
not shown. 
All Teachers Government Teachers ETP Teachers








Coeff (Col 3) 









(1) In Bottom Half of Initial Distribution -1.43 -1.21 -0.49 -3.86 -4.05 -4.15 -1.15
(0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.05)*** (0.33)*** (0.42)*** (0.40)*** (0.21)***
(2) Tracking School 0.15 0.16 0.21 Χ
2 = 0.66 1.63 1.00 1.08 0.38
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10)** p-value = 0.417 (0.65)** (0.78) (0.75) (0.34)
(3) In Bottom Half of Initial Distribution 0.18 0.08 -0.10 Χ
2 = 3.97 -0.42 -0.61 -0.39 -0.44
        x Tracking School (0.14) (0.12) (0.08) p-value = 0.046 (0.46) (0.61) (0.56) (0.30)
Constant 4.93 1.82 0.57 11.64 10.06 10.12 3.94
(0.23)*** (0.22)*** (0.16)*** (1.00)*** (1.20)*** (1.12)*** (0.56)***
Observations 5284 5284 5284 5283 5279 5284 5284
Maxiumum possible score 6 6 6 24 24 24 24
Mean in Non-Tracking Schools 4.16 1.61 0.67 6.99 5.52 5.00 2.53
Std Dev in Non-Tracking Schools 2.02 1.62 0.94 6.56 7.61 7.30 3.94
Total effect of tracking on bottom half:
Coeff (Row 2)+Coeff (Row 3) 0.33 0.24 0.11 Χ
2 = 2.34 1.21 0.39 0.69 -0.06
p-value = 0.126
F Test: Coeff (Row 2)+Coeff (Row 3) = 0 3.63 6.39 4.42 4.74 0.70 1.82 0.09
p-value 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.40 0.18 0.76
Difficulty level 1: addition or substration of 1 digit numbers
Difficulty level 2: addition or substration of 2 digit numbers, and multiplication of 1 digit numbers
Difficulty level 3: addition or substration of 3 digit numbers
Notes: The sample includes 60 tracking and 61 non-tracking schools. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels respectively.
Table 7
Effect of Tracking by Level of Complexity and Initial Attainment
Mathematics Literacy
















Tracking School 0.003 0.011 0.014 -0.015 0.000 -0.087
(0.012) (0.019) (0.022) (0.066) (0.028) (0.067)
In Bottom Half of Initial Distribution 0.027 -0.013 0.014 -0.006 0.050 0.042
(0.016)* (0.020) (0.025) (0.075) (0.028)* (0.073)
In Bottom Half of Initial Distribution x Tracking School -0.012 0.02 0.007 0.043 0.006 0.041
(0.013) (0.019) (0.023) (0.083) (0.026) (0.080)
Girl 0.012 0.029 0.041 0.020 0.024 0.055
(0.009) (0.014)** (0.016)** (0.049) (0.016) (0.060)
Girl x Tracking School 0.004 -0.048 -0.044 -0.026 -0.022 0.039
(0.013) (0.016)*** (0.019)** (0.067) (0.021) (0.079)
Assigned to Contract Teacher -0.006 -0.019 -0.025 -0.078 -0.014 -0.086
(0.010) (0.011)* (0.014)* (0.046)* (0.015) (0.055)
Assigned to Contract Teacher x Tracking School 0.018 0.009 0.027 0.056 0.038 0.142
(0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.076) (0.026) (0.092)
In Bottom Half of Initial Distribution 0.01 -0.035 -0.025 -0.01 -0.011 0.031
  x  Assigned to Contract Teacher x Tracking School (0.019) (0.030) (0.036) (0.093) (0.037) (0.104)
Constant 0.034 0.172 0.205 -0.737 0.23 2.11
(0.018)* (0.026)*** (0.032)*** (1.664) (0.034)*** (1.747)
Observations 7345 7345 7345 517 7340 515
Mean 0.057 0.119 0.175 0.175 0.224 0.224
Appendix Table A1
Does Attrition Vary Across Tracking and Non-Tracking Schools?
At Long-Run Follow-up Test
(a year after program ended)
Notes: OLS Regressions; standard errors clustered at school level. Additional controls not shown: a third degree polynomial in the student's percentile in the initial attainment
distribution. Columns 4 and 6: restricted to students within 0.1 standard deviation of median at baseline.
At Endline Test
(after 18 months in program)
47